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TELLING TALES IN COURT: TRIAL
PROCEDURE AND THE STORY MODEL
Richard Lempert*
OCCASIONS FOR STORIES

There are three ways in which stories may figure prominently at
trials. First, litigants may tell stories to jurors. Not only is there
some social science evidence that this happens,' but trial lawyers have
an instinctive sense that this is what they do. Ask a litigator to describe a current case and she is likely to reply, "Our story is ... "
Second, jurors may try to make sense of the evidence they receive
by fitting it to some story pattern. If so, the process is likely to feed
back on itself. That is, jurors are likely to build a story based on the
evidence given them, and the evidence that best fits a juror's preferred
story is likely to be given special weight while contradictory evidence
is discounted or disregarded.2
Third, the jury as a group may try to arrive at a collective story
in the process of reaching a verdict.' While no one to my knowledge
has systematically examined mock jury deliberations to see if the process resembles an effort to arrive at a collective story of what occurred, this seems to be a plausible interpretation of what at least
sometimes happens.4
* Francis A. Allen Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., 1964,
Oberlin College; J.D., 1969, Ph.D., 1972, University of Michigan. I would like to thank
Phoebe Ellsworth, Reid Hastie, and Nancy Pennington for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this piece.
I W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981).
2 See Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-BasedDecision Making: Effects ofMemory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION 521 (1988).
3 Alternatively, the jury may evaluate the case of the party having the burden of proof as a
story and find that it just doesn't hang together. See, e.g., M. TIMOTHY, JURY WOMAN chs.
13-14 (1974).
4 See, e.g., the mock jury deliberation reported in R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY

151-58 (1983). More generally, the process of deliberation which

Hastie, et. al., call "evidence driven," id., and Hawkins calls "deliberation in unity," C. Hawkins, Interaction and Coalition Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury Deliberations (1961) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Chicago), seems to be aimed at establishing a consensus on the facts from which a common
story can be constructed. Where jurors cannot agree on a story about what happened they may
turn to legal definitions of verdict choices for guidance. See Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads
Better Than One? 52 J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 218 (Autumn 1989).
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PENNINGTON AND HASTIE's RESEARCH

The research program that Pennington and Hastie summarize in
the article they prepared for this issue5 deals directly with only the
second of these ways. Pennington and Hastie are concerned with
processes of individual decision making; that is, with decision making
at the level of the juror. Their hypothesis is that at least in trials
where what happened is problematic (and in analogous situations in
nonlegal contexts), individuals try to make sense out of the facts available to them by assessing how well the facts fit into some plausible
story-like explanation of behavior. This hypothesis seems to be a natural extension of earlier psychological research which suggests that
individuals often make sense of data by fitting them into culturally
familiar and cognitively plausible explanatory patterns.6
Moreover, Pennington and Hastie explicate their hypothesis
through a series of carefully drawn studies using different materials
and methods which, taken together, indicate that the story model appears to explain much juror information processing, and where the
story model applies it appears to provide a more accurate portrayal of

juror decision making than other abstractions of rational decision
making, such as the Bayesian model or the anchor and adjust model.7
In my view Pennington and Hastie's research is well done and provides us with the most adequate portrait we have to date of how individual jurors assemble evidence in a form that allows them to

determine legal consequences.8
5 Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of JurorDecision Making: The Story Model, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
6 See, e.g., F. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY (1932); R. SCHANK & R. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING (1977); Nisbett & Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on

Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOLOGY REV. 231 (1977).
7 Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Further Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 58 J. PER. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY - (1990) (forthcoming).
8 As Pennington and Hastie note in their article in this journal, the story model is unlikely
to fit all trials equally well. See Pennignton & Hastie, supra note 5. It is likely to fit best those
trials in which the elements of an offense or cause of action are, like motive and causality,

elements that commonly enter into narrative stories. Thus it is not surprising that the story
model provides a good fit for Pennington and Hastie's main hypothetical case, in which a man
named Caldwell is stabbed during a fight by someone named Johnson. In the resulting homicide action there are a set of preexisting story templates (e.g., the "out to get him" story, the
"self-defense" story, etc.) that mesh with the different legal outcomes that the jury must choose
among. For similar reasons a juror's decision-making processes would probably be better explained by the story model if she were asked to determine whether supervisor X intentionally
did not promote Y because of Y's race, than if she were asked whether it was fair to assume
from a pattern of promotion decisions that Y and people of

rs

race were discriminated against

in the promotion process. Even in the latter instance, however, story-type thinking could figure since a defendant corporation faced with statistical evidence that suggested discrimination
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Lawyers are, however, likely to be less interested in whether or
how story construction affects individual juror judgments than in
whether story construction affects jury verdicts. We need not, however, determine whether juries in fact construct (or seek to construct)
a common story in order to conclude that juror story-construction
affects verdicts. There is by now a large body of evidence that suggests that most often juries decide cases in the direction of their original majorities (if an initial majority exists).9 Thus, if a lawyer can get
a majority of jurors to accept a story favorable to her (i.e., a story that
supports her theory of the case or a theory which carries the same
legal implications), she is likely to prevail when the verdict is
returned.
This brings us to the question of whether a lawyer's ability to
present her case as a story influences the stories that jurors impose on
the evidence. Here another study by Pennington and Hastie is directly relevant.' 0 In this study the ease of story formation was varied.
Some subjects received case information in story order, which is to say
in the temporal and causal order that matched the occurrence of the
original events, and other subjects received the same information in
witness order, which is to say that witnesses "testified" in turn and
each told the jury everything she knew about the events regardless of
where that information fit into the unfolding story of the events that
occurred. As hypothesized, the ease of story construction as determined by the order in which information was presented had a substantial effect on the verdict reached. Where the state's evidence was
presented in story order and the defense evidence in witness order,
seventy-eight percent of the college student mock jurors returned
guilty verdicts. Where the situation was reversed so that the defense
evidence was presented in story order and the state's evidence in witness order, the proportion of mock jurors returning guilty verdicts
dropped to thirty-one percent.
These findings are consistent with the results of a later study by
might feel that its only defense lay in telling a plausible nondiscriminatory story consistent
with the data. (Although it is too much of a digression to pursue the matter here, thinking

about the shifting of persuasion burdens and affirmative defenses might be advanced by considering how conducive different kinds of cases and defenses are to party storytelling and juror
story-formation.)
9 See, e.g., R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 4, at 63-76; H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487-90 (1966); Davis, Bray & Holt, The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries: A CriticalReview' in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ch. 26 (J. Tapp & F. Levine ed.
1977).
10 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 2.
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Pennington and Hastie t" and with the earlier research of Bennett and
Feldman. 12 Bennett and Feldman not only examined actual trials and
found that the presentation of evidence often took a story form, but
they also conducted an experiment with college students in which
they asked some students to tell others a brief story about something
that had happened to them or something they had done. Subjects
whose student identification numbers ended in even numbers were
told to relate a true episode while those whose identification numbers
ended in odd numbers were told to make something up. Bennett and
Feldman found that the truth of the story had no significant effect on
whether a majority of the audience judged the story to be true. What
did have an effect was story structure. The more coherent the story,
which is to say the less ambiguous the story connections, the more
likely the story was to be judged true, regardless of its actual truth.
While both the Pennington and Hastie studies and the Bennett
and Feldman experiment differ from trials in many important ways, I
think their basic findings are likely to generalize to actual trial situations. In other words, I think it is safe to say (or at least the wise
lawyer will proceed on the assumption) that the more coherent the
story a party presents at trial, the more likely it is that jurors will
accept that party's story independent of the informational content of
the evidence. A trier presented with a jumble of facts is, in other
words, less likely to find for the party presenting those facts than a
trier who receives the same factual information presented not as a
jumble but as a coherent story.
II.

STORIES AT TRIALS

This conclusion will, no doubt, strike few trial lawyers as surprising. Litigators, as I have already noted, often speak of their client's
cases as "our story," and they are aware of the need to present evidence in a way that does not confuse the jury. Nevertheless, evidence
at trials is often presented in witness order rather than story order,
and witnesses are not necessarily called at that point in the trial where
the bulk of what they have to say fits nicely into an unfolding story.
An arresting officer, for example, may be the first witness in a case. Is
this a mistake? Not necessarily, for a trial has more opportunities for
coherent story telling than the time devoted to the testimony of witnesses, and presenting one's witnesses in story order does not guarantee coherence. Some trial rules and practices promote, and others
inhibit, the presentation of coherent stories. Taking the psychological
II Pennington & Hastie, supra note 7.
12 W. BENNETr & M. FELDMAN, supra note 1, ch. 4.
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research as establishing the importance of telling coherent stories, it is
interesting to turn to the trial with the implications of the story model
in mind.
III.

VOIR DIRE

Story telling can begin as early as voir dire, for lawyers if given a
chance may seek to use voir dire to instruct a jury in their theory of
the case. A question from defense counsel like, "Could you believe
that a 200-pound man who is a black belt in karate might fear for his
life when faced with a 140-pound man with a kitchen knife?" serves
two functions. First, it suggests to the juror that the defendant, despite his apparent strength, will tell a story of a knife attack and a
killing (assuming this is a murder trial) in self defense. Second, it
seeks to determine the kinds of stories the juror is willing to accept.
The latter purpose is likely to be even more important than the former. There are other points in the trial where the defense (or prosecution) story may be told and told more coherently, but voir dire is the
only point where the lawyers can assess the receptivity of jurors to
particular stories and do something about it.13
It is, however, not easy to learn on voir dire what stories jurors
are prone to accept. In many courts, particularly federal district
courts, voir dire is a quick and shallow procedure. Judges ask most or
all of the questions, and a judge's questions are often directed not to
particular jurors but to the jurors as a group. Some judges allow lawyers to ask follow-up questions while others restrict them to suggesting questions which the judge need not ask. Even when lawyers
confront prospective jurors directly, they may learn little, for jurors
may not realize what stories they are prone to accept (or reject), or
14
they may lie when asked crucial questions.
Given the limitations of what can be learned on voir dire, lawyers
often assume that jurors with certain backgrounds will be more willing to accept certain stories or types of stories (e.g., guilty stories)
than others. Thus stereotypes seem to be widely used in jury selection
and different trial manuals make different suggestions about the kinds
of individuals who will be good jurors in particular cases. Where
enough money is involved, social science research may be called upon
to generate case-specific stereotypes, although there is reason to be13 A lawyer might become aware that one or more jurors are not buying her story as the
case proceeds, but by that point it is usually impossible to change her side's theory of the case.
14 In cases where there has been pretrial publicity, jurors may come to court already knowing a story or primed to accept a particular version of what happened. Voir dire also seeks to
identify such jurors, but is only sometimes successful.
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lieve that such stereotypes are of little help in typical cases,15 and they
may not be much more helpful in complex or highly publicized
cases.16 There is, however, one juror attitude that does seem related
to juror propensities to accept certain stories: the juror's attitude toward the death penalty in capital cases. Those jurors who report no
qualms about sentencing murderers to death seem more prone to accept conviction stories than jurors who are opposed to the death penalty.' 7 Indeed, the very process of death qualification seems to prime
jurors to accept conviction stories.'"
IV.

OPENING STATEMENTS

Turning to the trial itself, we find that lawyers are invited to tell
their clients' stories at the outset, for each side is given a chance to
make an opening statement, which is, in effect, an invitation to relate
a coherent story to the jury. These opening statements may condition
everything that follows. Later testimony presented in witness order,
which might be an unpersuasive jumble of facts without an opening
statement, may be coherent and persuasive when a jury has heard an
opening statement that sets the facts into context. For this reason, it
would be interesting to replicate Pennington and Hastie's story order
versus witness order research with mock jurors exposed to coherent
opening statements.
Some students of the jury have claimed that a case is virtually
resolved with the opening statement, meaning by this that if jurors
could be polled throughout the trial their final verdicts would almost
always be the verdicts they preferred after the opening statements.
The story model tells us why mock jury data might suggest this even
if no decisions are in fact reached on the basis of opening statements.
If each party tells his or her story in the opening statement and the
later evidence is consistent with each story, it is not surprising that
the jurors' choices of stories to believe after opening statements is the
same as their choices after all the evidence is in.
Opening statements may, however, have substantial effects on fi15 See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 4, at 123-50.
16 See, e.g., Saks, The Limits of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical & Empirical, 17
JURIMETRICS J. 3 (1976).
17 See the articles in the special issue of Law and Human Behavior on death qualification.
See, especially, Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'
Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53
(1984); Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction
Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes Into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984).
18 Haney, On the Selection of CapitalJuries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification
Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
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nal verdicts, and not just by making it easier for jurors to form a
coherent whole out of the evidence that follows. Pennington and
Hastie report 9 that their subjects were more likely to recognize information they had seen which was consistent with their preferred stories than information which was inconsistent, and they were also
more likely to falsely recognize evidence they had not seen (i.e., think
the evidence had been presented) if that evidence supported an inference that subjects were likely to have made in constructing their preferred stories than if it did not support such an inference. More
generally, if one has a strong theory it can affect not only what information is remembered but how information is coded in the first instance. 20 Thus, winning the battle of stories in the opening statements
may help determine what evidence is attended to, how it is interpreted, and what is recalled both during and after the trial. For example, a juror who regards the story offered in the prosecution's
opening statement as more plausible than that offered by the defendant, may because of this see ambiguous information as consistent with
a guilty story and preferentially retain information that favors the
prosecution's case.
V.

PRESENTING A CASE

If there is one piece of advice for lawyers which seems directly
importable from the Pennington and Hastie research, it is that evidence should be presented to the trier of fact in story order rather
than witness order. Witnesses, in other words, should not be asked to
tell the fact finder everything they know about an event, but their
evidence should be presented the way a story unfolds, which ordinarily means in chronological order.
Rule 611 of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") 2 I and its
state counterparts allow this to happen, for the rule gives the trial
judge flexibility in determining the mode and order of interrogation.
Thus, with the court's permission a lawyer can call a witness, have
her tell part of what happened, allow her to step down, and then recall her at a later point when what she still has to say fits more nicely
into the story.
Occasionally testimony is broken up in this way, but it is unlikely
19 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 2.
20 R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF

66-75 (1980).
21 "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective
for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
SOCIAL JUDGMENT
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ever to be a regular occurrence even if lawyers influenced by the work
of Pennington and Hastie think it is desirable. First, lawyers need the
cooperation of their witnesses. Many witnesses might find it sufficiently inconvenient to testify at several points in a trial that cooperation with a lawyer who insisted on this would be imperiled; so lawyers
would not insist. Second, even if the lawyers regularly insisted, under
Rule 611 the judge in exercising control over the order of interrogation should aim, among other things, at avoiding the undue consumption of time.22 The interrogation of a witness who tells everything she
knows when first called is likely to be less time consuming than the
interrogation of a witness who is recalled on several occasions. Finally, lawyers and judges are simply accustomed to hearing everything a witness has to say at once. They might not be comfortable
calling and recalling a witness on several occasions. Also, recalling a
witness might suggest that she had not been completely frank in the
first instance or might allow the opposing side to better prepare for
cross-examination. If so, more ground might be lost with the jury
than that which would be gained.
VI.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Rule 611 also contains the basic rules that regulate cross-examination. But from a story-model perspective the problem might not be
abusive cross-examination but the institution itself. Cross-examination can break up a story's coherence. While one side might try valiantly to arrange its case in story order, the other side may be able to
disrupt the coherence of that story through cross-examination. Such
disruption will not prevent jurors from constructing stories-Pennington and Hastie's original stimulus was a filmed trial reenactment
with realistic cross-examination-but it may be that even a cross-examination which yields no important new facts results in jurors constructing stories different from or less firmly held than the stories that
un-cross-examined direct testimony would otherwise have elicited.
For this reason I think it is important to replicate Pennington and
Hastie's story-versus-witness-order experiment with simulations involving vigorous cross-examination.2 3
If cross-examination does break up stories, this may be an argument that favors the preference in Rule 611 for cross-examination
22 See id.
23

Bennett and Feldman's complementary story-telling research, W. BENNETT & M.

FELDMAN, supra note I at ch. 4, also did not present subjects with stories disrupted by cross-

examination.
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that is limited to the scope of the direct examination.24 Wide open
rule cross-examination potentially allows far more disruption of a
story and confusion of the issues. Indeed, in a wide open rule jurisdiction the strategy of having a witness testify as a story unfolds could be
easily disrupted since the first time the witness testifies the cross-examiner might ask her about matters that the direct examiner does not
wish to broach until a later time.
Cross-examination may, of course, have nothing directly to do
with the witness's story but may instead go to the credibility of the
witness. This too may disrupt a direct examiner's story, particularly
if it is elaborate enough to constitute a story about the witness which
is independently interesting to the jury. A juror who puzzles over
whether a witness is a truth teller may recall less of what the witness
said, regardless of how she eventually resolves the credibility issue.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the story perspective with
respect to cross-examination is that it calls into question one of the
most basic adages of trial practice; namely, cross-examination should
be waived unless there is a particular point or points that the crossexaminer knows she can make. Breaking up a story temporally or
logically might itself give some point to an otherwise empty and unhelpful cross-examination.
At the same time the story perspective strongly supports another
bit of trial practice advice: that the cross-examiner should not simply
take the witness over the story she has already told. A story heard
twice is likely to be better remembered than a story heard a single
time.
VII.

EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY

Another set of issues that the story perspective highlights is that
surrounding the problems that are raised by gaps in evidence. Here
all exclusionary rules of evidence are potentially implicated, for any of
them may cause a gap which makes a story less credible. What is
worse, an exclusionary rule may give rise to a spoliation inference. A
juror may assume that because gap-filling evidence was not presented
when a story clearly called for it, the evidence does not exist. Thus
the juror may find the story less credible. Moreover, the nonexistence
of excluded evidence may be consistent with the opposing story and
so make that story more credible.
24 "Cross examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The Court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." FED. R. EvID.
611 (b).
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This suggests one reason why it may be important that most of
the nonconstitutional exclusionary rules of evidence (FRE 404(b) is
an example)2 5 exclude evidence only for particular inferences and not
for others. Too many gaps would be created if evidence legitimately
relevant and admissible for one point was barred because it was irrelevant and inadmissible on some other.
At the same time, the story model helps explain the limited effectiveness of limiting instructions when evidence is admissible for one
purpose and not for another, and it tells us why a jury may focus little
direct attention on material it has been instructed to disregard yet still
appear to be influenced by it.26 Even if a jury does not inappropriately resort to limited admissibility evidence in its deliberations, the
evidence may serve to fill a gap that otherwise would have made one
party's story less credible. For example, in a particular case where the
defendant appears generally middle class and attractive, a jury might
find the defendant's persona inconsistent with the story of criminal
behavior that the prosecutor tells. The protagonist and the actions
simply do not fit. If, however, the prosecutor can introduce a defendant's prior crimes for a legitimate purpose, such as showing knowledge, the jurors without ever discussing or even being aware of the
issue will no longer perceive any incongruity between the defendant's
persona and the crime of which he or she is accused. Thus, if evidence of a prior crime is admitted for a legitimate purpose, no matter
how slight its probative value for that purpose, the likelihood of a
criminal conviction should rise.2 7 If evidence works by filling story
gaps that would otherwise be perceived, it is hard to see how any
limiting instructions could change the situation. The jurors are not
overtly relying on the limited admissibility information; rather, they
are failing to see problems with the prosecution's story that would
stand out had the information not been given.
25 FRE 404(b) disallows evidence that an accused has committed other crimes when this
fact is relevant only insofar as it suggests that an accused has a criminal propensity. However,
the rule allows evidence of other crimes vhen that evidence is relevant for some other purpose
such as showing identity or motive. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
26 See, e.g., Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1958);
Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some EmpiricalEvidence on the Effect of S.12 of the CanadaEvidence
Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L. Q. 88 (1972); Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act and the Deliberationsof Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L. Q. 235 (1976); Wissler &
Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use PriorConviction Evidence to
Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
27 If these speculations about the implications of the story model where character is relevant to the stories jurors might construct are correct, the increase in conviction rates should be
greater where the defendant appears to be middle class than where, even without the other
crimes evidence, the defendant appears disreputable. This implication should be easy to test
empirically.
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VIII.

JUROR QUESTIONS

The story perspective and the problems gaps pose also speak to
the wisdom of allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses. Since
neither lawyers nor judges can anticipate the gaps that jurors will perceive, it seems wise to allow jurors to ask questions. If jurors cannot
ask questions when they perceive gaps, they will puzzle over them
nonetheless. They may make spoliation inferences or close gaps by
assuming information consistent with their preferred stories. It is better that jurors receive accurate information, if it is available and admissible, than that they make up information based on where their
stories would otherwise take them. Moreover, allowing juror questions may reveal to the attorneys the stories that jurors are prone to
construct and so may let the lawyers better focus their arguments.
IX.

CLOSING STATEMENTS

As the trial draws to its end, there are closing statements, instructions and deliberations. Closing statements, like opening statements, are a chance for lawyers to put together the material of a trial
in the form of a story. They are the last chance for a lawyer to show
how the evidence she has presented coheres into a convincing whole.2"
Closing statements also allow, and in practice require, a lawyer to
deal with the opposition's evidence. The story model suggests' several
promising tactics. One is to assimilate the other side's evidence, or as
much as can be accommodated, into one's own story or to reinterpret
the other side's evidence to make it irrelevant. A second tactic is to
point out gaps in the story the opponent attempts to tell. A third is to
point to apparent facts which the opponent's story cannot accommodate. These are not mutually exclusive options, and the same closing
statement may make an attempt at each of them.
X.

INSTRUCTIONS

After the closing arguments come the instructions. These play a
special role in the Pennington and Hastie story model, for they present the jury with the verdict categories into which the stories they
construct must ultimately fit. It is also possible that instructions
shape the ultimate stories that are constructed. Certain facts that
were difficult to accommodate may appear irrelevant to the instructed
juror while what were troublesome gaps may become less so. Or, the
28 The party with the burden of proof must always do this. The defending party, as Bennett and Feldman, supra note 1, point out need not present a story because it can prevail by
convincing the court or jury of the inadequacy of the opponent's story.
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opposite effect may occur. A juror may realize that her story does not
fit any verdict category very well, and it may be necessary to make
sense of gaps or hitherto ignored evidence to arrive at a story that
clearly implies one verdict. It may even be the case that a juror's
strongest sense is that a particular verdict is correct, and that once the
requisites of that verdict are known the juror adjusts her story with
the verdict in mind.
One frequently suggested reform is to instruct the jury at the outset of a case. The story model suggests that this might help the jury
make sense of a case. Rather than construct a story which in the end
turns out to be poorly fitted to the decision-making task the jury confronts, the juror knows at the outset the requisites of that task and can
construct a story with these requisites in mind. Pre-instructions can
help jurors focus on the most relevant evidence the parties offer and
may prevent them from giving undue weight to episodes that are of
little importance from a legal standpoint. Pre-instructions do this by
directing juror attention toward certain aspects of the parties' cases
and away from others.
It is not clear, however, that this is a good thing. The jury system may function better if jurors confront the law's requisites (as
given in the final instructions) with stories that have been constructed
based on naive understandings of what is just and folk views about
what is important evidence. Perhaps it is in the confrontation of law
and story that the benign nullification--one might call it popular justice-which Kalven and Zeisel describe29 resides. If there is this kind
of trade-off, it might be wise to limit pre-instruction to those lengthy
and complex cases in which an uninstructed juror may be prone to
construct stories which, when confronted with the law's requisites,
appear far off the mark. Where a juror is likely to be overwhelmed
with information, pre-instruction may serve to limit the amount
of largely irrelevant evidence that helps shape a story and increase the
amount of relevant evidence that the story is designed to
accommodate.
XI.

DELIBERATIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

Finally, there are the deliberations in a case. Pennington and
Hastie note that jurors construct different stories and that jury deliberations often consist of a contest over which story is to prevail. Interestingly, jurors often find the story contest surprising because
before deliberations begin, they find it difficult to perceive how any
29

H.

KALVEN

& H. ZEISEL, supra note 9.
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story other than one similar to what they have constructed can be
drawn from the evidence.
A major cause of different juror stories is the different background information that jurors bring to their deliberations. For example, in the mock trial which forms the basis for much of
Pennington and Hastie's story model research, one evening the defendant, Johnson, carrying a knife, entered a bar frequented by a man,
Caldwell, with whom he had quarreled that afternoon. Middle- and
upper-class jurors were more prone than lower-class jurors to find the
defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The reason was that they
could construct no story which made sense of the fact that Johnson
was carrying a knife other than the story that he planned a murderous
assault on Caldwell should a confrontation occur. Working- and
lower-class jurors on the other hand found it not only plausible but
perhaps likely that a man like Johnson would carry a knife wherever
he went for general protection. Indeed, in one filmed deliberation of
this trial that I observed, a woman juror, arguing that the presence of
a knife carried with it no sinister implications, stated that she probably had a knife in her pocketbook at that very moment.
Expert testimony on such background issues as whether people
of the defendant's social class regularly carry knives is, in theory, allowed under FRE 702, because the rule provides that "specialized
knowledge" from experts is admissible if it will "assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence." 30 In practice, however, the admissibility
of such evidence is largely discretionary with the judge, and many
judges are reluctant to allow experts to testify to "what ordinary people know." The problem is that ordinary people know different things
about the same subject matter, yet they may believe that everyone
"knows" what they do.
But even if judges were more willing than they are to admit expert testimony on such matters, there would still be many cases where
potentially helpful testimony of this sort would not be presented to
the jury. This would be not only, or I think even primarily, because
lawyers and clients did not have the resources to hire such experts,
but also because lawyers like individual jurors would think there was
only one interpretation that could be put on the evidence. To continue with the Johnson example, a Legal Aid lawyer used to working
with lower-class criminals might well think that her client's claim that
he habitually carried a knife for protection was patently reasonable
and should be seen as such by all jurors. The fact that she saw her
30 FED.

R. EvID. 702.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:559

client's story as a "normal account" might lead her to underestimate
the importance of proving and arguing this point.
One benefit, perhaps the most important benefit, of the focusgroup type presentations that some lawyers use in trial preparation is
that the group's discussion brings home to the lawyer the different
understandings that reasonable people can have of the evidence she
intends to present. In such circumstances lawyers should, of course,
try to put evidence in context and to present experts when they fear
that their preferred interpretation of evidence will appear utterly implausible to jurors of certain backgrounds. However, considerable evidence may be open to divergent interpretations, and even if a lawyer
is in every instance aware of the possibility, no court would tolerate a
succession of experts telling a jury how to use its common sense.
Thus protection against the class-biased discounting of unfamiliar,
but in fact plausible stories must be found largely in the diversity of
the jury. Reducing the number of jurors from twelve to six members,
a "reform" that has been particularly popular in civil cases, entails a
substantial cost in this respect. 3 I
CONCLUSION

I have taken Pennington and Hastie's research and their story
model quite seriously in this paper-perhaps too seriously. While I
believe that their research provides us with our best insights to date
on how jurors decide cases, extrapolating from their research to actual trials is a venturesome endeavor. Presenting evidence in story
order may, for example, count for less in the courtroom than in Pennington and Hastie's story-versus-witness-order experiment because it
is possible that cross-examination can make the coherent presentation
of evidence seem less coherent and hence less persuasive. Moreover,
procedures that have not been studied in the laboratory, like opening
31 See, e.g., Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible"Differences:EmpiricalResearch and the
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1975). As I write, the twelve-member civil jury is in
danger of being effectively abolished in lengthy cases in federal district court even if the judge
or district prefers to try such cases to twelve-member juries. Proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have been sent to Congress eliminate alternate jurors in
civil cases and provide that all seated jurors who remain at the end of a trial will deliberate on
the case. See PROPOSED FED. R. Civ. P. 48, 111 S. Ct. at ccxxxiii (1991). By itself, the latter
policy is a worthy reform which should increase the effective size of civil juries in many courts
from six to seven or eight. However, the amended rule also provides that no more than twelve
jurors may be seated. In a lengthy case, where numbers are likely to be most important, even if
twelve jurors are seated originally, fewer than twelve are likely to remain at the end of the case.
Indeed, I expect that some particularly lengthy complex cases will have to be retried because
seating twelve jurors at the outset will not prevent the jury from diminishing to fewer than six
people, which will mean that without party consent a binding verdict cannot be returned.
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and closing statements, may so profoundly affect how jurors respond
to evidence that what Pennington and Hastie teach us is no guide to
policy or practice.
The realities of trial practice may, in other words, render meaningless the lessons one might draw from Pennington and Hastie's
reasearch. They may, but I do not think they will. Pennington and
Hastie, assisted by Bennett and Feldman, have convinced me. I believe that thinking of jurors as story builders and of the trial as an
occasion for story telling provides a useful perspective for both those
who practice law and those who would reform it. Nevertheless, my
extrapolations from Pennington and Hastie's research of implications
for trials are no more than hypotheses. Almost all of them rest on
empirical suppositions that can and should be tested.
Perhaps most importantly the normative Status of the story
model itself should be tested. As story model research filters into the
world of practice, lawyers may work more self-consciously to tell convincing stories and the result may be that they are more persuasive.
But will justice be enhanced thereby? My analysis has proceeded on
the assumption that trial rules should promote coherent story telling,
but perhaps certain trial rules, like the right to cross-examination, are
valuable precisely because they interfere with the neat presentation of
stories and sensitize jurors to the different interpretations that may be
put on evidence. Perhaps jurors are more likely to discern the truth
when presented with a jumble of unorganized facts that they must
themselves arrange than they are when these facts have been self-interestedly organized into coherent stories. At some point in their research program I hope Pennington and Hastie, or someone whom
they have inspired, will address these issues. Jurors may construct
stories from the evidence they are presented with, and certain forms
of evidence presentation may make the story construction process easier than it would otherwise be. But is the most easily constructed
story the best explanation of trial evidence? This is an open question.

